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The Federal Advisory Committee Act:
Balanced Representation and Open Meetings in
Conflict with Dispute Resolution
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CENTRAL ROLE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEES
IN RESOLVING IMPORTANT POLITICAL DISPUTES IN SOCIETY
Advisory committees are formed by governmental agencies to render
advice on proposed rules and regulations. All advisory committees "have
one common thread of a partnership of private citizen participation into the
decision-making process of the Federal Government." Advisory
committees are composed of parties representing groups whose interests will
be affected by a proposed rule. These parties negotiate public interest
disputes.2
Although the exact form of dispute resolution employed by advisory
committees can vary by committee, it is generally described as consensus
building. 3 Some committees, formed under the Negotiated Rulemaking
Act, 4 engage in negotiated rulemaking. The consensus-building process of
other committees approximates this process to varying degrees. 5 For the
purposes of this Note, both negotiated rulemaking and consensus building
will be called "negotiation" and treated as such.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) is an attempt to bring
accountability to the negotiation process of committees. The negotiation of
regulations in advisory committees is seen by some as a method for
restoring confidence in the democratic process for resolving public policy
disputes. 6 Advisory committees were not, however, always seen as
furthering democratic ends. In the past, there was concern that special
11984 FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITrEES: THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 1984, at 1 (1985).
2 STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG El" AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,
AND OTHER PROCESSES 345 (1992) ("The most extensive use of consensus-building
negotiations to resolve public policy disputes has been the negotiation of regulations by
federal agencies.").
3 Id. at 346.
4 5 U.S.C. § 561 etseq. (1994).
5 Philip J. Hatter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: 7he History, Needs, and
Future of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1393, 1403-07 (1983) (describing the
model of negotiated rulemaking as a consensus-building process); JAMES E. CROWFOOT &
JULIA M. WONDOLLECK, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 18 (1990) (treating negotiation and consensus building together as the
essence of public policy dispute resolution).
6 See, e.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987).
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interests were exercising too much influence over the agencies that were
regulating them.7 FACA was passed as an attempt to control and limit the
influence of advisory committees, so as to curtail the illegitimate influence
of special interests over the agencies.8 FACA's aim is to restore
accountability to advisory committees, while recognizing their importance,
and to ensure that they remain only advisory in nature. 9 But "the procedures
used to enforce rationality and accountability actually inhibit the ability to
gain information and develop consensus. "10
The "balanced representation" and "open meetings" requirements of
FACA, two requirements seen as central to restoring public confidence in
advisory committees," are also two of its most controversial requirements
and are most likely to affect the negotiation process that occurs within the
committees. 12
This Note will describe the controversial effect of FACA on the
negotiation process of advisory committees. The focus will be on the open
meetings and balanced viewpoint provisions. The aim of this Note is to
suggest ways in which the courts and agencies should interpret these
provisions in the future to help ameliorate the inhibiting effects of FACA on
the consensus-building process. Contrary to current case law trends that
attempt to avoid application of FACA altogether, 13 an interpretation of
FACA that allows closed meetings when necessary and when balanced
representation exists would best serve to resolve disputes involving advisory
committees. Obstacles in the recent case law will be discussed, and methods
for achieving this objective will be given. The theory that will be defended
in this Note is that the closed-meeting requirement can be met by using
subgroups of committees to resolve the sensitive issues while maintaining
compliance with FACA's open-meeting requirement.
7 Richard 0. Levine, The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 10 HARV. J. ON LEts. 217,
219 (1973).
8 Levine, supra note 7, at 219.
9 1d. at 225.
10 Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. LJ. 1, 22
n.128 (1982). See also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 352-56 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Sierra
Club maintained that because the EPA considered evidence after the period for public
comment ended, interested parties were not informed of new developments in time to make
meaningful comments).
11 S. REP. No. 281, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992).
12 Hatter, supra note 10, at 22-25.
13 See Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009, 1014 (D.D.C.
1994) (noting that in two recent cases the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit were able to
avoid application of FACA by "adroit semantics and near-clairvoyant discernment of
legislative intent").
[Vol. 11:2 1996]
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT
II. THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMrrTEE ACT
This section will discuss the provisions of FACA and, more
specifically, describe the overall process of committee formation, meetings,
and recommendation. The objective is to give the reader a general
understanding of the statute, its purpose, and the process through which
committees operate.
A. The Purpose of FACA
The principal purpose of FACA is to "enhance the public accountability
of advisory committees . . . and to reduce wasteful expenditures on
them." 14 The other purposes of FACA are, inter alia, to keep Congress and
the public informed with respect to the number, purpose, membership
activities, and cost of advisory committees, 15 and to ensure that the
committees remain advisory and do not actually determine the issue for
which they were formed.16 Given that the central purpose of FACA is to
provide open meetings, the proposed theory that allows for closed meetings
must overcome a higher burden. First of all, it should be made clear that
even early in FACA's history there were closed meetings. 17 This fact
indicates that the requirement for open meetings was not absolute. Another
theory is that Congress did not intend that use of the phrase "open
meetings" meant that every aspect of a meeting should be open for advisory
committees.18 The proposal defended herein will also have measures that
protect the value of openness.
B. Advisory Committee Defined
FACA provides a broad definition of "advisory committee." 19 A group
is an advisory committee if it is either "established" by statute, the
president, or an agency, or it is "utilized" by the president or an agency "in
14 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 459 (1989).
15 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b)(5) (1994).
16 5 U.S.C. app. § 2(b)(6) (1994).
17 1976 Federal Advisory Committees: Fifth Annual Report of the President, Fiscal
Year 1976, at 3 (1978). (reporting that of 259 open meetings that year, there were 33
completely closed meetings and 25 partially closed meetings).
18 See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
19 One court has recently described FACA as "uncomfortably broad." Northwest Forest
Resource Council, 846 F. Supp. at 1010 ("[I1f literally applied, [FACA] would stifle virtually
all non-public consultative communication between policy-making federal officials and a
group of any two or more other people, any one of whom is not in government service.").
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the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one
or more agencies or officers of the Federal Government .... "20 FACA
excludes committees composed wholly of full-time officers or employees of
the federal government. 21 The breadth of this definition is illustrated by the
possibilities that an advisory committee could be a group privately formed
yet "utilized" by an agency22 or established by an agency before their
advice is sought.23
C. Restrictions on Advisory Committees
Advisory committees have been criticized for a number of reasons from
various viewpoints. 24 FACA's enactment was the result of citizen groups'
complaints that the impact of advisory committees on the decision making
of agencies was generally contrary to public interest. 25 As one of four
measures26 aimed at restoring public confidence in governmental decision
making, FACA requires that: (1) advisory committee meetings be open to
the public;27 (2) certain notice requirements be met to ensure that "all
interested persons are notified of meetings prior thereto"; 28 (3) interested
parties be allowed to attend, appear before, or file statements with any
advisory committee;29 and (4) the committees' documents and records,
including minutes, be available for public inspection.30 In addition, before
an advisory committee can be established, the committee must be approved
20 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (1994).
21 Id.
22 Center for Auto Safety v. Tiemann, 414 F. Supp. 215, 223 (D.D.C. 1976),
remanded on other grounds, 580 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
23 Levine, supra note 7, at 225.
24 Id. at 219; Hatter, supra note 10, at 33.
25 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 92d Cong., 2d Seas. 6 (1972) ("One of the great dangers
of unregulated use of advisory committees is that special interest groups may use their
memberships on such bodies to promote their private concerns."); see also Levine, supra note
7, at 219.
26 The government's attempts to limit agency discretion and increase agency
accountability include-in addition to FACA-the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1994); ex
pane prohibitions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d) (1976);
and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. H 1984). Lawrence
Suskind & Gerard MeMahon, The 7heory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J.
ON REO. 133, 135 (1985).
27 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(l) (1994).
28 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(2) (1994).
29 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(3) (1994).
30 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 10(b) & (c) (1994).
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by the agency, 31 and a charter must be filed.32
D. The Committee Process: Formation and Negotiation
As mentioned above, the negotiation process in which committees
engage is either negotiated rulemaking or consensus building. The former
process is explicitly encouraged by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act ("Neg-
Reg"). 33 These are very similar processes.
31 5 U.S.C. app. § 9(a)(2) (1994).
32 5 U.S.C. app. § 9(c) (1994).
33 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Ralemadng Before Federal Agencies:
Evaluation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74
GEe. LJ. 1625, 1705 (1986). Even before the passage of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act
(hereinafter Neg-Reg), Perritt thought that negotiated rulemaking groups were advisory
committees. Regulatory negotiation groups most likely are advisory committees under FACA.
Id. A regulatory negotiation group is most likely to be established by an agency "in the
interest of obtaining advice or recommendations." Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. app. § 3 (1994)).
Agencies will not have delegated their statutory authority to make rules. Id. Therefore, Perritt
concluded, FACA was applicable. Id.
Since the passage of the Neg. Reg., agencies have been "encourage[d] ... to use the
[negotiated rulemaking] process when it enhances the informal rulemaking process." 5 U.S.C.
§ 561 (1994). The authority of agencies to establish rulemaking committees is found within
FACA and under their enabling Acts. Pub. L. No. 101-648, § 2(6), 104 Stat. 4970 (1990).
The definition section of the Neg-Reg defines a negotiated rulemaking committee as an
"advisory committee established by an agency in accordance with . .. the Federal Advisory
Committee Act to consider and discuss issues for the purpose of reaching a consensus in the
development of a proposed rule." 5 U.S.C. § 562(7) (1994). Such committees may be formed
by an agency if it is determined that the committee can "adequately represent the interests that
will be significantly affected by a proposed rule and that it is feasible and appropriate in the
particular rulemaking." 5 U.S.C. § 565(a)(1). If the agency decides not to establish the
committee, then notice must be sent to any parties who were potentially interested in
participating. 5 U.S.C. § 565(a)(2) (1994). Unless necessary to achieve proper functioning or
balance, the membership of the committee is limited to twenty-five members. 5 U.S.C.
§ 565(b) (1994). The committee is to reach a consensus on a proposed rule or other matter
determined by the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 566(a) (1994). A process is set whereby the committee
can agree to the selection of the facilitator. 5 U.S.C. § 566(c) (1994). Agency representatives
have the same duties and responsibilities as other members of the committee. 5 U.S.C. §
566(b) (1994). This person is different from both the facilitator and the federal official who is
authorized to adjourn the meeting under 10(e) of FACA. 5 U.S.C. § 566(c) (1994). The
records of the committees must be kept and are subject to public disclosure through the
provisions of FACA. 5 U.S.C. § 56 6 (g) (1994).
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One explanation of the negotiation process divides it into three stages. 34
In the first stage, a decision is made by an agency to negotiate a particular
rule. A convener is chosen, whose tasks include the following: identifying
and contacting potential stakeholders, setting deadlines, helping participants
to obtain financial and technical resources, providing negotiation training if
needed, and handling requests for participation. The convener's job is
basically removing obstacles from the negotiation of the rule.3" Meanwhile,
the internal agency staff must satisfy FACA notice and charter
requirements. 36
In the second stage, negotiation occurs.3 7 During this process
timetables are set, fact-finding is commenced, subcommittees are organized
and preliminary proposals are drafted, major differences in interests are
confronted, records of all agreements reached are kept, and a draft of the
proposed agreed-upon rule is developed.3 8 The proposed rule is developed
through negotiation among the competing interests represented in the
committee.
Negotiated rulemaking, in theory, involves the stakeholders and agency
representatives engaging in voluntary face-to-face negotiations to determine
how a given interest will be regulated. 39 It is a collaborative, as opposed to
adversarial, process between former adversaries to gather information,
discuss options, and develop a consensus. 4 ° If consensus is reached, a
proposed rule is published in the Federal Register and public comment is
invited before the rule is made effective. 41
In the final stage, the constituencies of the participants are persuaded to
support the rule and a formal agreement is drafted to support the proposed
rule during the public comment phase. 42 The committee may be reconvened
after the comment period is over to discuss and respond to the comments
produced, if any. 43 By including the interested parties in the development of
the rule, in theory there should be fewer challenges to the rule than under
the old process. 44
34 Suaskind & McMahon, supra note 26, at 150.
35 Id.
3 6 1d.
37id.
3 8 Id.
39 Susakind & McMahon, supra note 26, at 136.
4 0 id. at 137.
41 id.
4 2 Id. at 151.
43 Susakind & McMahon, supra note 26, at 151.
44 Id. at 137.
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E. Authority of Advisory Committees
While advisory committees are usually not delegated actual authority to
pass a regulation, 45 the committee charters may require near-delegation of
this authority. For example, one committee ended its negotiations with an
agreement that required the EPA to publish (for public comment) the rule
the committee recommended without any substantive changes. 46 This
commitment by the agency to adopt the proposed rule resulting from the
negotiation is common and has raised the concern of critics. 47 Their
complaint is that the agency is refusing to exercise its authority as an
independent decision-maker. 48 The bargaining power of the agency is not to
be under-estimated, however, because no rule will be passed unless the
agency agrees.49
The benefits to society from this type of deal-making also seem to
outweigh the harm done by any reduction in decision-making power of the
agency. In the above example, the committee members agreed not to oppose
or challenge the rule in court, as long as no substantive changes were made
to it.50 This agreement indicates that one of the benefits of a successful
negotiation is a reduction in litigation challenging the regulations of the
agency. This is a clear saving for society in terms of the foregone costs of
litigation.
At the other end of the spectrum are committees that are formed simply
to advise the agency on certain facts that will affect the policy underlying
the proposed regulation. One commentator called these committees
"Scientific and Technical Committees." 51 They have more narrow and
manageable assignments than do general committees negotiating broad
45 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Analysis of Four Negotiated Rulemaking Experiments, 50-118
(Sept. 4, 1985) (Draft Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS))
[hereinafter Perritt, Analysis] quoted In Suaskind & McMahon, supra note 26, at 158 n.121
("Under all curient conceptions of negotiated rulemaking, and clearly reflected in ACUS
guidelines, negotiators play only an advisory role in the agency; the agency retains the final
decision making authority."); Perritt, supra note 33, at 1705 (agencies will not have delegated
their statutory authority to make rules).
46 Hazardous Waste: Manifest Commitee Closes Most Issues; Will Review Broad
Concepts In December, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 173, at D-16 (Sept. 9, 1993)
[hereinafter Hazardous Waste].
47 NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POuCY, & PRACTICE
§ 12.11 (2d ed. 1994).
48 Id.
49 Id.
5 0 Hazardous Waste, supra note 46, at D-16.
51 Levine, supra note 7, at 218.
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public policy.52  Through these committees, scientists, and other
professionals give highly specialized advice to executive departments such
as Defense; Agriculture; and Health, Education, and Welfare. 53 Although
one might think that these types of groups appear more politically stable,
Technical Committees can be extremely controversial. 54 These groups still
have significant power to influence the agency; however, the power is more
indirect.
Whether the committee is engaging in the negotiated rulemaking
process under Neg-Reg, or developing consensus on a technical data
recommendation, FACA exerts tremendous influence over the nature of the
negotiations. As we shall see in the next section, this influence can be
detrimental to reaching a sound consensus.
HI. NEGOTIATION THEORY AND FACA: OPENNESS AND
BALANCE
This section begins with a more detailed description of the open
meetings and balance provisions of FACA. These provisions are most often
cited as inhibiting the negotiation process. Next, a discussion of negotiation
theory is given to provide context for the criticisms of the open meetings
and balance requirements based on their negative effects on negotiation.
These set the stage for a discussion of the suggested solution to the conflict
between the requirements of FACA and effective negotiation.
A. FACA as an Impediment to Dialogue.
Some argue that FACA is an impediment to consensus between the
agencies and interested parties for a number of reasons. 55 Only two of these
52 Levine, supra note 7, at 218.
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash.
1994); Northwest Forest Resource Council, 846 F. Supp. 1009; National Nutritional Foods
Aas'n v. Califano, 603 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1979).
55 CROWFOOT & WONwOL, supra note 5, at 23 (stating that the lack of flexibility in
the FACA structure inhibits non-traditional procedures from being used to help bring
conflicting parties to a consensus). The review by Congress and the executive branch of
advisory committees in general, required to ensure that they are performing their function, 5
U.S.C. app. §§ 5-7 (1994), can hinder their ability to adequately resolve an issue. Harter,
supra note 10, at 22 n.128. For example, President Clinton recently issued an executive order
cutting the number of advisory committees by one-third. Exec. Order No. 12,838, 58 Fed.
Reg. 8207 (1993). FACA imposes various standards not fully conducive to negotiations.
Harter, supra note 10, at 22. The charter requirement has been described as time-consuming
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reasons will be discussed here: (1) the open meetings requirement, and (2)
the balanced viewpoint requirement.5 6
1. Balanced Viewpoint Requirement
While FACA requires that a committee's composition be fairly
balanced in the viewpoints represented, the statute does not clearly define a
"balanced viewpoint." Legislative history suggests that this provision
"require[s] that membership of the advisory committee shall be
representative of those who have a direct interest in the purpose of the
committee." 57 The courts have therefore required that a fairly balanced
committee include those who have a direct interest in the purpose of the
committee. 58 This does not mean, however, that "Congress intended the
'fairly balanced' requirement to entitle every interested party or group
affected to representation on the committee."5 9 Furthermore, there is no
right created by the statute in representation on a committee.' ° One court
has stated that the appropriate inquiry is whether the committee's
membership "represent[s] a fair balance of viewpoints given the functions to
be performed." 61
While each interested party may not be entitled to representation, there
are methods for ensuring that representation of each party is achieved. 62
This is a desirable end because it reduces the possibility of future litigation
and it helps to instill confidence and acceptance of the resulting rule.
and burdensome. Perritt, supra note 33, at 1704. FACA gives supremacy to an officer of the
federal government, by authorizing the officer to adjourn, the meetings and prohibit a
committee from conducting business in the absence of that officer. Harter, supra note 10, at
33; 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(e) (1994). FACA also emphasizes that an advisory committee is just
that-advisory; the final action is within the determination of the agency. 5 U.S.C. app. § 9(b)
(1994). All of the above suppress the organization of regulatory-negotiation committees.
56 Hater, supra note 10, at 22, n.128 (noting that uncertainty tends to discourage
contacts between the agency and the private sector).
57 S. REp. No. 1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972).
5 8 Public Citizen v. National Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods,
886 F.2d 419, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
59 Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, Ctv.A No. 88-186,
1988 WL 21700, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 1988)).
60 Id.
61 National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm. of the President's Private Sector
Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
62 Susskind & McMahon, supra note 26, at 155-56.
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2. The Open Meetings Requirement
The concept of open meetings has a few potential meanings. Within the
context of FACA, it means that reasonable notice will be provided to the
public of the time, place, and subject matter to be discussed of advisory
committees. Furthermore, committee documents can be obtained by
members of the public upon request. Finally, members of the public may
have an opportunity to express their concerns to the committee for
consideration in the negotiation. The open meetings requirement does not
provide a right to participate in the meeting itself.
The requirement for public meetings has been described as "inhibiting"
the consensus-building process. 63 The open meetings provision, if strictly
interpreted and applied by courts, could make exploration by committees of
potential resolutions to disputes difficult. 64 Originally, the only exceptions
to the open meetings requirement were those allowed by subject matter
under the Freedom of Information Act.65 In 1976, an amendment was
passed which included exceptions to the Freedom Of Information Act's
[hereinafter FOIA] open meetings requirement within the group of
exceptions allowed to FACA's open meetings requirement. 66
FACA meetings are open to the public unless good cause is shown to
hold the meeting privately. 67 Advisory committee meetings are closed to the
public under FACA only when they involve: (1) matters covered by
exceptions 1-7 of the Freedom of Information Act; (2) criminal accusations
directed at a person or other formal censures of a person; (3) frustration of
proposed agency action if prematurely known; or (4) agency participation in
formal rulemaking litigation. 68 The General Services Administration's
(GSA) regulations implementing FACA also allow certain meetings to be
exempt from FACA. 69 These meetings include: (1) meetings for the
purposes of exchanging information, 70 (2) meetings held by a private group
(not an agency) for the purpose of expressing the group's views so long as
63 Hater, supra note 10, at 33; Perritt, supra note 33, at 1704-05. But cf. James T.
O'Reilly, Committees and Competition: Restoring Industry Input to Federal Advisory
Committees, 41 Bus. LAw. 1293, 1294 (1986) (noting that the open-meetings requirement of
FACA has generated little litigation compared to other legislation requiring documentary
access).
64 Perritt, supra note 33, at 1703.
65 id.
66Id.
67 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(a)(1) (1994).
68 Perritt, supra note 33, at 1703-04.
69 41 C.F.R. § 101.6.1004 (1994).
70 Id. at 41 C.F.R. § 101.6.1004(h)(1) (1994).
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the group does not use the group as a "preferred source of advice or
recommendations," 71 and (3) meetings for the purpose of "obtaining the
advice of individual attendees and not for the purpose of utilizing the group
to obtain consensus advice or recommendation. " 72 Subcommittees of
advisory committees are covered by FACA, according to the preamble of
the GSA regulations, only when they report directly to the agency rather
than through the main advisory committee. Additionally, informal meetings
of two or more members of advisory committees are not covered by FACA,
according to the preamble, when the purpose of the meeting is (1) to gather
information, (2) to conduct research, or (3) to draft option papers for the
full advisory committee. 73
In order to get around the FACA requirements of open meetings and
published notice, the agency head to which the committee must report must
authorize the confidentiality of a meeting in accordance with standards set
up by the FOIA.74 This process is awkward and time-consuming in the
negotiated rulemaking context. 75 Harter suggests that FACA should be
revised to allow for a more hassle-free method of conducting negotiated
rulemaking meetings in private.76
B. Negotiation
Negotiated rulemaking is an alternative to the hybrid method of
rulemaking. The hybrid method of rulemaking was the result of a process
laid out in the Administrative Procedure Act and supplemented by judicial
and legislative action. Theoretically, its foundations were in the adversarial
process of dispute resolution. Critics of the hybrid process have charged
that its shortcomings, 77 rooted in its adversarial nature, have evoked the
need for the negotiated rulemaking process alternative. 78
1. The Political Legitimacy of Negotiation
Proponents of the negotiated rulemaking process claim that one of its
71 41 C.F.R. § 101.6.1004(h)(2) (1994):
7241 C.F.R. § 101.6.10040) (1994).
73 Federal Advisory Committee Management, 48 Fed. Reg. 19324 (1983).
74 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552b(c), (d)(l), (1994).
75 Hatter, supra note 10, at 85 n.458.
7 6 Id. at 85.
77 See Susskind & McMahon, supra note 26, at 133-34 (listing complaints from al
groups about federal rulemaking).
78 Hatter, supra note 10, at 6.
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benefits is that it imparts political legitimacy to the resulting regulation. 79
This is because it seeks to include all interested parties and allows the public
to scrutinize the decision-making process.
The political legitimacy, at least among the negotiators, of a negotiated
rule is assured by the self-interest of the participants."0 The theory is that
the negotiators will not agree to a rule which they cannot accept. 81 If all
interested parties are included in this process, then overall political
legitimacy of a negotiated rule should be achieved. The result is that
voluntary compliance with the rule will help to lower enforcement costs and
present fewer challenges to the rule.
Without getting into an in-depth exploration of the theoretical
foundations of negotiated rulemaking, 82 this subsection will explore the
open meetings and balanced representation aspects of negotiation theory.
2. Balance In Negotiation
The need for balanced participation in negotiation is grounded in its
tendency to promote (1) the finality of the resolution and (2) a breadth of
information and ideas. While there are concerns that suggest a requirement
of balance is not always beneficial, no concerns argue openly against it.
Defining balance is perhaps a more controversial issue than requiring it.
The opposite is true for open meetings. For now, the need for balance will
be discussed.
If all interested groups are not included from the beginning or satisfied
by the result, the consensus-building process could be lost. 83 Public
79 Harter, supra note 10, at 6. One group of commentators discusses the need for
negotiated rule making in public policy disputes as follows:
Though our representative democracy-with its separate levels and branches
of government-is the foundation of our political system, we need to improve the
ways in which we use it to resolve public disputes .... In particular, we need to
find ways of dealing with differences that will restore public confidence in
government, and improve relationships among various segments.
SUSSKIND & CRUIKSHANK, supra note 6, at 10.
80 Harter, supra note 5, at 1405.
81 Id.
82 See Susakind & McMahon, supra note 26, at 140-42, for a discussion of the theory
of negotiated rulemaking.
83 GOLDBERG Er AL., supra note 2, at 339; Susskind & McMahon, supra note 26, at
141; CROWFOOT & WONDOLLECK, supra note 5, at 20 ("For [the environmental dispute
settlement process] to be effective, all groups with a stake in the conflict must be identified
[Vol. 11:2 1996]
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT
participation helps to develop a political base on which to rest a decision.8
4
This in turn will reduce challenges to the decision and thus allow society to
avoid the costs of resolving those challenges.8 5 It is more beneficial to
include as many interested parties as possible, despite the logistical
problems that may arise, than to exclude a potentially interested party who
could raise problems later in the negotiation process or after a hard fought
agreement has been won among the participating parties.8 6 "Even on
technical committees, the intent of the legislation was to suggest inclusion
of consumer or other non expert public members." 87 The idea is to start
with a large number of representatives and reduce the number by selecting
appropriate representatives.88
Balanced representation also brings broad sources of information for
agency decisions.8 9 By allowing public participation and challenges to the
government experts, new ideas can be raised and considered. 90 Balanced
participation, especially in the technical committees, helps to build a sound
scientific base for the committee recommendation. Two commentators,
Susskind and McMahon, stated the issue as follows:
If, during the review and comment period, qualified experts testify
that important scientific evidence has been ignored or misinterpreted, the
result should clearly be judged an inferior or unwise rule. Although the
wisdom of the negotiated rule will become clear once the rule has been
implemented, it might be disastrous to delay evaluation until that point. 91
The interaction between these two concerns, political legitimacy and the
need for broad bases of information, is illustrated precisely by the
comments of parties excluded from the advisory committee used to resolve
the spotted owl controversy:
By excluding opinions other than those viewed acceptable by the
and involved.").
84 Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & James A. Wilkinson, Open Advisory Committees and the
Political Process: The Federal Advisory Act 4fter Two Years, 63 GEO. L.J. 725, 727 (1975).
85 Id. at 728. Full participation can diffuse opposition by creating a sense of obligation
by the regulated to abide by regulation which they had a role in developing. Id. This is
especially important when the regulation depends on voluntary compliance. Id. at n.15.
86 GOLDBERO r AL., supra note 2, at 339.
87 O'Reilly, supra note 63, at 1300.
88 GOLDBERo Er AL., supra note 2, at 339.
89 Perritt & Wilkinson, supra note 84, at 727.
901d. at 728.
91 Suiskind & McMahon, supra note 26, at 141-42.
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team, the president's scientists skewed the range of options considered,
eliminating alternatives that would have inflicted far less suffering on the
hard working citizens of the Pacific Northwest. 92
Without the FACA procedures, our data was ignored, industry
scientists' views were ignored, and other scientists on the team withdrew
when other outside opinions were ignored.... Tnhere will be plenty of
time to show that a different substantive outcome would have occurred
[under the FACA procedures]. 93
These statements voice both the political dissatisfaction of being excluded
from the negotiations as well as the concern about considering all possible
points of view.
There does not appear to be anyone who opposes balanced
representation per se, but some are concerned that a balance requirement
(1) waters down the quality of advice given to the agency by allowing
untrained representatives to fill the seats that could be filled by trained
representatives and (2) endangers the ability to achieve resolution by
allowing too many parties.
The business community is concerned with the potential for bad advice
being given due to mandatory participation by those who are less familiar
with a regulated industry or lack technical knowledge. 94 The loose guidance
given by Congress and the implementing regulations is interpreted as a
grant of wide discretion on the part of the agency to appoint members based
on technical skill or representative status. 95 Attempts to satisfy either of
these values often imply a cost in terms of the other. Some have suggested
that one solution in weighing these two values is to require a cap on the
percentage of public interest or consumer group representatives on a
committee. The result would be to allow committees to bring together those
with the most business and technical skill and thus provide the best possible
advice to the government. This is not a consensus view. In general, the
business community's view is not in favor of mandatory caps on the number
of representatives of public interests allowed, but is in favor of a minimum
education level or experience requirement. 96
92 Foresny: Judge Rules Not to Block Forest Plan, Says Clinton Administration Broke
Law, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 55, at D-12 (March 23, 1994) (quoting a March 12,
1994 statement by the Northwest Forestry Association).
93 Id. (quoting a March 22, 1994 statement by Mark Rey, Vice President of the
American Forest and Paper Association).
94 O'Reilly, supra note 63, at 1298.
95 Id. at 1299.
96 O'Reilly, supra note 63, at 1303.
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The second concern with balance is that it might make committee size
unmanageable. The result would be a failed negotiation process. The
consensus today is that twenty-five is an appropriate upper limit for
committee size. One way to reconcile these two values-manageable
negotiation and balanced representation-would be to work with "pools" of
parties. The idea would be to start with a large pool. The members of the
pool would form groups with common interests in the issue and then select
representatives from that pool. This process has met with some success and
can help to ameliorate the negative effect of a balance requirement on the
size of the advisory committee. There are some instances when there are too
many diverse interests for this process to work. In these cases, negotiation
is not the appropriate method to achieve a resolution of the issue. The
proposal presented here is directed at those instances when negotiation is
appropriate given the number and diversity of interests.
3. Open Meetings in Negotiation
There are at least three competing interests involved in the dispute over
the wisdom of requiring confidential negotiation: (1) promoting effective
negotiation, (2) preserving evidence for judicial and administrative
proceedings, and (3) "promoting public access to information needed for
accountability and decision making in a democratic society." 97 Those who
are for and against public negotiations can best be viewed as placing their
focus on one of these interests. Those who oppose open meetings focus on
its negative impact on effective negotiation. Those who are in favor of open
meetings focus on the need for political accountability.
a. The Need for Openness
Those who favor open negotiations give at least four reasons why
closed meetings would undermine political accountability: (1) openness
helps to equalize power differences between parties, 98 (2) closing the
meetings precludes consideration of important advice, 99 (3) where public
interests are involved the public should be aware of how these interests are
being negotiated, 100 and (4) wrongfully excluded parties will have a more
difficult time challenging the results of a closed meeting than they would an
9 7 GOLDBERo ur" AL., supra note 2, at 179.
98 Perritt, supra note 33, at 1639.
99 Perritt & Wilkinson, supra note 84, at 730.
100 C£f. GOLDBERo ET AL., supra note 2, at 180 (Noting that the social policy for
allowing public access to negotiation discussions is strengthened when the negotiation involves
an issue of public interest and not of private interest like divorce).
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open meeting. Each of these reasons will be briefly elaborated.
Open meetings help to equalize the bargaining power between the
traditionally powerful special interest groups and the traditionally weaker
public interest groups.101 Open meetings allow the public interest groups to
get public support through the media. 102 This allows them to raise money
needed to carry on the negotiation1°3 and also to put outside political
pressure on the special interest groups.1°4 Unless public interest groups feel
that they will come to the negotiation table on equal grounds and will have
something to gain through negotiation rather than traditional means of
dispute resolution, they will avoid negotiation altogether. 10 5 If all interested
parties are not present, the legitimacy of the negotiation process is
threatened. In addition, the results of a negotiation perceived to be
imbalanced will seem less legitimate in the weaker parties' eyes. Therefore,
the tendency of open meetings to equalize the bargaining power of the
parties is essential for legitimacy.
Closing the meetings precludes consideration of important advice.
Allowing the public to comment on the negotiations or the proposed rule
during the negotiations helps to present all relevant angles on the issue and
instills a sense of legitimacy by allowing the non-participating public to feel
that they had input in the negotiation process.
The public should be allowed access to meetings where public interests
are being negotiated. The concern about confidentiality in negotiation in the
public policy context differs from the concern about confidentiality in
101 CROWFOOT & WONDOLLECK, supra note 5, at 3. "Citizen organizations are most
often the least powerful party among the multiple parties seeking to influence a specific
environmental policy or management decision." Id. They have fewer dollars and staff and
depend on contributions, legal rights, sympathy, and the "traditions of a pluralistic and
democratic political culture." Id. They are also in competition with each other for influence
over environmental policies. Id.
102 Id. at 171-72 (stating that name recognition was necessary for public interests to be
recognized as a powerful interest in the dispute and noting that participation in an open
process can improve citizen group's image by allowing recognition of knowledge of
willingness to resolve an issue and that well-planned media campaigns allow environmentalist
groups to present their view in the best possible light).
103 Id. (noting that for organizations "building... membership through public
action .... anonymity could be deadly").
104 Id. at 145 (quoting Karita Zimmerman, Negotiated Investment Strategies: A New
Approach to Public-Private Partnership (1984) (unpublished M. thesis in City Planning, MU)
("Extensive publicity ... serves as political leverage when implementing the agreement as well
as re-stimulating interest in the proceedings. An informed public becomes the watchdog in a
controversial negotiation.")).
105 Id. at 29.
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negotiation of individual rights. 106 Private party mediation and negotiations
involve individual interests, rights, and information to which the public's
right to know is less strong. In broad policy negotiations, where more
global concerns and interests are involved, the public's right of access to
negotiations is stronger.
The fourth concern is that non-participating interested parties might be
forced into a position of trying to change the agency's decision in a short
time in the face of a long consensus-building process supporting the
decision. 10 7 In addition, the parties would have to do so without access to
the information considered in forming the decision l and burdened by the
administrative hassles of getting access to that information. °9
In sum, open meetings help to provide political legitimacy to committee
meetings. Open meetings make the process more fair and more thorough.
Open meetings allow public scrutiny of decisions that will effect the
public's rights and provide wrongfully excluded parties with a better
opportunity to present their claims.
b. The Need for Privacy
Confidential communications between private parties and agencies are
looked down upon or prohibited by the current political environment. 110
Nevertheless, there are those who believe that negotiation is best carried out
in private. 111 These viewpoints can be illustrated in terms of a concern
about effective negotiation.
Public access is believed to have a negative effect on negotiation by
discouraging parties from compromising in politically unfavorable ways. 112
Philip Harter, a major figure in the field of negotiation and consensus
building, 113 gives at least four reasons for the need for privacy in
negotiation based on the promotion of effective negotiation. First,
concessions are a necessary part of negotiating a consensus. 114 The problem
10 6 See GOLDBE o ET AL., supra note 2, at 289.
10 7 Perritt & Wilkinson, supra note 84, at 730.
log Id.
109 Id. (stating that agency response to a Freedom of Information Act request for
minutes or recommendations could take a long time).
110 Hatter, supra note 10, at 84.
111 O'Reilly, supra note 63, at 1296 (describing the ideal committee meeting as
confidential to encourage disclosure); Hater, supra note 10, at 84.
11 2 GoLDBERO T AL., supra note 2, at 179.
113 Id. at 345 (describing Hatter's Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Maldaise as a
"seminal article").
114 Hatter, supra note 10, at 84.
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with open meetings is that unpopular concessions must be explained to
constituencies and sometimes this means telling part of the constituency that
their interests were not of central importance.11 5 Private negotiations
prevent the injection of the press into the relationship of the participants and
the mediators.116 Therefore, the constituency has less knowledge of the
concessions their representatives made in order to reach their results. As a
result, the representatives can maintain face with all of their constituencies.
Second, confidential or potentially damaging data will not be revealed
at a public meeting because of various risks, including the loss of an
advantage over business competitors and the possibility of future
litigation.11 7 Therefore, openness creates a disincentive to reveal all relevant
data. The core of administrative law is reliance on expertise in the
agency.118 Before rules or regulations can be formulated, the agency and its
committees require full access to pertinent information from a variety of
sources determined by the supposed effect of the regulation.1 19 Without this
information, the committee cannot negotiate effective rules. The
information may be revealed as the basis of a proposed rule. However, there
is a disincentive of revealing the information early due to the risk of
negotiation breakdown and the loss of confidentiality and its effects on
subsequent disputes. 120
Third, there is a disincentive to participate in a negotiating process if
parties believe that the positions they assume for the process may be used
against them in a later dispute. 12 1 For example, private companies and
agency representatives have been reluctant to attend meetings at the FTC for
115 id. See also Perritt, supra note 33, at 1665.
116 Hatter, supra note 10, at 84 n.452; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 2, at 179 . After
two years of failing to reach an agreement with interested parties through open negotiation,
the Virginia Department of Transportation hired a mediation company to help resolve a
dispute about the location of a highway. The Government and neighborhood representatives
convened a meeting. The group decided to exclude others, including the press, and authorized
the mediators to issue periodic public reports about their progress. Richmond newspapers filed
a suit in state court asking that all persons attending the mediation be enjoined from holding a
closed session. They argued that the Virginia Freedom of Information Act requires open
meetings when the entities involved are supported wholly or principally by public funds and
are created to advise a public body. The Department of Transportation countered by claiming
that a mediation privilege created an exception to the access requirements. Before the court
could resolve the case, however, the parties reached an agreement.
117 Hatter, supra note 10, at 84.
118 Perritt & Wilkinson, supra note 84, at 726.
119 Id. at 726.
120 Hatter, supra note 10, at 84.
121 Id.
[Vol. 11".2 1996]
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT
this reason. 122 The concern from both points of view was that if strategies
and information were revealed at an early stage of a negotiation, then the
negotiation could break down and those positions and strategies could be
used against them in the future.123 Therefore, they were unwilling to meet
openly with agency officials and go on record as endorsing certain points of
view or positions.
Fourth, the public forum may cause parties to continue to stake out
extreme positions and to be reluctant to compromise from these positions. 124
This is caused by constituency pressure and clearly acts as an inhibitor to
the consensus-building process. If the participants fail to retreat from
extreme and inconsistent positions, then common ground between them
cannot be achieved. Parties will be pressured to adopt the extreme positions
of their constituents, whose views are formed without consideration of the
other interests involved. From the constituency point of view, any perceived
concessions could threaten the representative's position as representative.
Therefore, the representatives have an incentive to stake out extreme
positions in open meetings where their constituencies are watching their
every move.
Despite these problems, Harter admits that highly technical and
controversial standards are often developed in open meetings and that "the
negotiation process can clearly work in public." 125 Even politically heated
regulations may, per experience, be capable of negotiation in public. 126
IV. SOLUTIONS
There is a conflict between the need for political legitimacy in the use
of advisory committees and the need for effective negotiation in advisory
committees. By requiring openness of committee meetings in the attempt to
ensure accountability, FACA threatens to undermine effective negotiation in
the committees for the reasons laid out above. But closing committee
meetings, even parts of committee meetings raises the concerns of those
who favor open negotiation. In resolving this conflict inherent in the
structure of FACA, any proposed solution would need to adequately address
each of these concerns.
This section has two major components. First, the proposed solution
will be laid out in more detail. Arguments will be given that the above
122 Robert B. Reich, Regulation by Confrontation, 59 HARV. Bus. RLry. 82, 88-89
(1981).
123 Id.
124 Hater, supra note 10, at 84.
125 Id. at 84 n.455.
126 Id. at 84.
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concerns based on negotiation theory can be adequately satisfied by this
solution. Second, the legal bases and obstacles of this proposed solution will
be examined.
A. Proposed Solution
A solution to this problem, which addresses all the relevant concerns, is
to allow subgroups of the parties to negotiate their sensitive disputes behind
closed doors, but only when balanced representation exists in the
committee. 127 This proposal selectively addresses the need for privacy in
committee meetings. While closing all meetings would undermine the
concerns of those who are in favor of open meetings, the proposal allows
members to make certain disclosures and to adopt positions outside of
public scrutiny. The requirement of balance in the full meeting addresses
concerns about accountability. The main mechanism for ensuring
accountability is the application of pressure from balanced representation at
the full committee level on the subgroup to privately negotiate in solutions
that are acceptable to the full committee. If all interested parties are present,
the formation, composition, and negotiation of private subgroups will be
externally influenced by the full committee to resolve sensitive disputes
legitimately. At the same time, those who embrace concerns about open
meetings are provided a forum to ameliorate their concerns, namely private
subgroup meetings.
If committee meetings are to be closed, two possible procedures could
be followed to decide how information from these meetings would be
presented to the public: (1) provide a rule saying no one may publicly
characterize the view of another in a public statement-a process used in
dialogue groups of business people and environmentalists; 12 or (2) a ban on
public statements unless agreement after review by all parties. 129 In any
event, a process should be developed whereby parties agree not to use the
information disclosed during the negotiations against each other.
B. Closing Subcommittee Meetings
By allowing certain groups of committees to break off and negotiate
behind closed doors in certain circumstances, all concerns about open
meetings can be met. The use of closed subcommittee meetings has become
a regular practice with advisory committees. 130 It is, however, a
1 2 7 ROERS & MCEWEN, supra note 47, at 59.
128 Harter, supra note 10, at 85 n.460.
129 Id. at 85.
130 Robert Brenner, Policy Director of the EPA Air Office, and Lone Schmidt,
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controversial practice, especially to those being closed out.131 Certain
limitations need to be established to ensure that the concerns listed above
are addressed. The main prerequisite for allowing closed subcommittee
meetings should be a finding of balanced representation in the committee
itself.
Combining open committee meetings with closed subcommittee
meetings satisfies the concerns of those who favor open meetings. The
effect of equalizing the bargaining power between parties is not lost because
the public interest groups can still attain publicity through the open full
committee meetings. Public awareness of how public interests are being
negotiated at the full committee meetings would exist. Agreements by
private subgroups not to disclose certain information may also include
agreements to allow disclosure of other aspects of the negotiation process.
The resolution of the issue negotiated in private would be communicated to
the full committee and to the public. The problem of parties being forced to
change a rule in the face of a hard fought negotiation has no application to
the closing of a subcommittee. The reason for this, as discussed below, is
that the subcommittee cannot have a legally closed meeting and advise the
agency (or the executive). Those parties member to the full committee can
attempt to influence the result of the subcommittee negotiation by opposing
it in the full meeting negotiation. In sum, all of the concerns of those in
favor of open meetings are adequately satisfied by the proposal of closing
subcommittee meetings.
The concerns of those opposed to closed meetings are also addressed by
allowing subcommittee meetings to be closed. Unpopular concessions on
sensitive issues can be held confidential if made in a closed meeting of a
subcommittee. Subcommittee members can make the necessary concessions
while preserving the representatives' political credibility. The risk of
disclosing confidential information needed for effective negotiation is
minimized by use of the closed subcommittee meetings in conjunction with
agreements to keep disclosures confidential. Similarly, the risk of taking
positions during closed meetings is also reduced. Finally, when
subcommittees are behind closed doors, the incentive to take extreme
positions and the reluctance to compromise, which exist in open meetings,
will dissipate.
Assistant EPA General Counsel for Air and Radiation, told a BNA reporter that closed
subcommittee groups "happen all the time during regulatory negotiations and other
occasions." Air Pollution: State, Auto Representatives Meet in Private on Cal Lev Alternative,
ENV'T. REP. (BNA) No. 238, at D-17 (Dec. 14, 1994).
131 An attorney for Public Citizen, David Vladick, said that the fact that "they do it all
of the time does not make it legal." Id.
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C. Balance Ensures Legitimacy
Closed meetings, it has been argued, will not damage the political
legitimacy of the results of negotiations among appropriate
representatives. 132 If meetings are closed in appropriate circumstances, 133
the safeguard of public scrutiny is protected by the negotiation process
itself.'3 4 The political legitimacy derives from the adoption of the regulation
by the balance of the participating parties and not from the openness of the
meetings. 135 "[The nature of negotiated rulemaking... [appropriately
pursued] ensures the adequacy of representation of affected groups. Thus, it
provides its own form of political accountability, which probably is greater
than when the agency makes rules unilaterally."136 "If the negotiation takes
place among appropriately balanced interest representatives, the opportunity
for adversarial exploration of policy and factual issues is preserved in the
negotiation itself." 137 Therefore, the issue of accountability should not
preclude closed meetings, at least in certain circumstances.
The problem is that the scope of the concerns that this argument
addresses is too narrow. It does not account for a party wrongfully excluded
who must face the agency and its rule after the negotiation.
Balance in the full committee will supply pressure for closed
subcommittees to resolve issues in ways that will be acceptable to the full
committee. If committee members negotiate separately and privately, then
they will be under pressure of achieving a consensus which all parties can
agree. The same pressure will help to achieve a compromise on the concern
about watering down the advice from technical committees.
Private meetings of experts can be held where the negotiation will not
be hindered by non-sophisticated participants. In addition, as there is no
limit on the number of consultants a committee may use, if a wider range of
experts is needed, the subgroup could work with extra consultants. At the
same time, if their proposal is accepted by the committee, it will help to
ensure political legitimacy as well. Privacy of the subgroup meeting will
lead to candid disclosure of the facts. If a subgroup proposal based on
confidential facts impedes agreement in the committee, then either the
subgroup can reconvene in private to re-negotiate, or an impasse has been
reached in which no confidential information has been released; in either
132 This qualified position may indicate that those who are in favor of closed negotiation
cannot also favor less balance.
133 Hatter, supra note 10, at 84.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Perritt, Analysis, supra note 45.
137 Id. at 159 n.123.
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case, there is no risk of early disclosure of information.
D. Legal Basis of Proposed Solution
This proposal is directed toward both agencies using committees to
develop policy proposals and to reviewing courts. The following section
describes for the agency the legal constraints and support for the proposal.
In addition, a procedure for helping to ensure balance, as well as a
procedural standard for review, is provided.
There is precedent in the case law and the relevant authorities that may
offer a solution to the inherent contradiction within FACA. 138 The solution
involves two propositions: if (1) there is a fairly balanced membership of
the parent committee then (2) subgroups of advisory committees should be
allowed to hold closed meetings. 139 The legal underpinnings of the latter
proposition shall be taken up first.
In the past, the application of FACA to certain groups has been
uncertain.14o One type of group that has been particularly controversial is
138 National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm. of the President's Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 557 F. Supp. 524 (D.D.C.) (holding that task forces chaired
by members of presidential commission are not advisory committees), aO'd, 711 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Consumers Union of United States v. Department of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 409 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C.) (explaining that presentation by industry group on
voluntary industry-sponsored proposal was not an advisory committee where agency lacked
authority to regulate the subject), affid, 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nader v. Baroody,
396 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that White House meetings with selected private
groups are not advisory committees). See also cases decided under the Sunshine Act, 5
U.S.C. § 5526 (1994), e.g., FCC v. 1T" World Communications, 466 U.S. 463 (1984)
(holding that informal background sessions or negotiations are not "meetings").
One commentator argues that FACA is concerned with the communication of advice to
the agency and not how the advice is developed among the private interest groups. Perritt,
supra note 33, at 1705 ("FACA applies only to sessions at which the agency is present, not to
negotiating sessions or caucuses from which the agency is absent.").
139 There are cases which may allow meetings to be closed to protect effective
deliberations, especially where the committee membership is balanced. Compare Nader v.
Dunlop, 370 F. Supp. 177 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that FACA does not permit closing ali
meetings to protect deliberative consultations among members) with Aviation Consumer
Action Project v. Washburn, 535 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (approving closure of portions of
3 of 20 meetings because intra-agency memoranda within exemption 5 of Freedom of
Information Act had been discussed).
140 Federal Advisory Committee Management, 48 Fed. Reg. 19,324 (1983) (discussing
uncertainty in the application of FACA to groups formed on an ad hoe basis and to private
groups which advise an agency).
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the subgroup of an advisory committee. 141 FACA requires that groups
which are "utilized or established by" the executive of an agency be subject
to its provisions. 142 Subgroups which report to the parent committee and are
established by the parent committee do not, according to case law,143 fall
under this category.
In National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Committee of the
President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control,144 the court held that
task force meetings, co-chaired by members of the parent committee, were
exempt from FACA because the task forces were formed to gather
information and formulate recommendations for the committee to consider.
They lacked authority to advise either the president or the agency which
established the parent committee. 145 The court stated as its reason for so
holding:
[Slurely Congress did not contemplate that interested parties like the
plaintiffs should have access to every paper through which
recommendations are evolved, have a hearing at every step of the
information-gathering process and preliminary decision-making
process, and inteuject themselves into the necessary underlying staff
work so essential to the formulation of ultimate policy
141 GEN. AccT. OFF.., Better Evaluations Needed to Weed Out Useless Federal
Advisory Committees, GEN. ACCT. OFF. REP. 19 (Apr. 7, 1977).
142 Association of Amer. Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 921-22
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (Buckley, J., concurring):
[Blecause committees not composed exclusively of federal officers and employees
have members who are not required to foreswear their private associations and
insulate themselves against potential conflicts of interest, FACA requires, as an
alternative check, that their deliberations be conducted in open.
143 Id. Analytically, this category could include subgroups, if the notion of "utilized" by
an agency or the executive is interpreted broadly to include groups utilized by committees.
144 557 F. Supp. 524 (D.D.C.), afrd, 711 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also IT
World Communications, 466 U.S.at 465 (holding that the Sunshine Act did not require that
meetings between a panel of the FCC and foreign officials be open to the public). Congress
recognized, according to the Court, that "informal background discussions [that] clarify issues
and expose varying views' are a necessary part of an agency's work." 466 U.S. at 469
(quoting Senate Report on Sunshine Act). Therefore, the Court found that strictly applying
FACA requirements to such discussions would "impair normal agency operations without
achieving significant public benefit." Id. at 470.
145 557 F. Supp. at 529.
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recommendations. 146
In addition to the case law, the GSA's regulations (implementing
FACA) define "meetings" in such a way as to preclude application of the
openness provision to deliberations 147 that relate to the advisory
committee's function:
[FACA does not apply to] [m]cetings of two or more advisory
committee or subcommittee members convened solely to gather
information or conduct research... to analyze relevant issues and facts,
or to draft proposed position papers for deliberation by the advisory
committee or a subcommittee of the advisory committee[.J " 148
Thus, there are both case law and agency sources which allow for
subgroup meetings to be closed.
Some have criticized these interpretations as a loophole that allows
committees to avoid the openness provisions by acting through
subcommittees. 149 An amendment to FACA was proposed in 1992 to fix
this and other problems with the statute. ° The purpose of the proposed
amendment was to require openness but also to recognize that subgroups did
not require a charter or balance. 151
Opening all subgroup meetings causes problems by overlooking the
potential benefits to the negotiation process resulting from flexibility to
close these subgroups'meetings. 152 Some parties are more willing to engage
in the process, and ultimately to make concessions on highly controversial
issues, so long as they are assured of at least a limited amount of
confidentiality.15 3
Difficulty arises when it comes to establishing a legal basis for the
146 557 F. Supp. at 529.
147 Perritt claims that using the GSA definition to exempt meetings from the openness
provision would "distort the negotiation process, and would not entirely eliminate the
possibility that a court would find that the spirit of the GSA regulations were violated, or that
the regulations contravened FACA." Perritt, supra note 33, at 1706.
148 41 C.F.R. § 101.6.1004(k) (1994).
14 9 S. REp. No. 281, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1992).
150 Id. at8.
151 Id.
152 Four case studies suggest that meetings which were only nominally opened were not
adversely affected by this fact. Perritt, supra note 33, at 1707. It is noteworthy, however, that
FACA was interpreted in these cases as permitting closed meetings of subgroups and
caucuses. Id.
153 Perritt, supra note 33, at 1707.
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proposition of a balanced representation requirement. The fair balance
requirement is the most litigated provision of FACA.1 54 There is no
standard expressly provided by the statute to determine when a committee's
membership is fairly balanced.1 55 In addition, the lack of a standard has
caused controversy in the case law. Some even claim that the issue is not
justiciable. 156
Unfortunately, this note will not provide the magical standard for
determining when a committee's membership is fairly balanced. Indeed,
such a feat may be impossible given the widely varying functions of
advisory committees and the divergent interests and issues for which they
are formed.
Instead, the solution proposed herein is a procedural test for
determining when relief should be granted based on an alleged violation of
the balance requirement. Based on the concerns of negotiation theorists, this
test provides guidelines to help determine if procedure has been followed.
This helps ensure that the risk of excluding interested parties, and so
undermining the negotiation process, has been minimized. The test is meant
as a supplement to the test used by the courts based on the function of the
advisory committee. The proposed test has three prongs:
(1) Has the agency followed a process designed to reasonably ensure
representation from all interested parties and was the complaining party
excluded through some fault of her own?
(2) Is the negotiation process ongoing or has the advisory committee
made its recommendation?
(3) Will the public comment period of the rulemaking procedure give
the party an adequate opportunity to have input into the rule, and what is
the nature of the affected interest?
The first part of the first prong of the test is meant to ensure that at
least an opportunity was presented for balance to be achieved. The 1992
amendment provided a method for judicial review of the balance
requirement that focused on the procedure followed by the federal official
whose duty it was to establish a balanced committee.15 7 The official was to
concentrate on including both public and private sector groups as well as
other relevant interests. 158 A plan designed to ensure balance 59 and the
154 S. REP. No. 281,102d Cong., 2d sess. 9 (1992).
155 O'Reilly, supra note 63, at 1299.
156 See National Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria, 886 F.2d, at 426
(Silberman, J., concurring) ("I cannot discern any meaningful standard that is susceptible of
judicial application in the [fair balance requirement]. . .).
157 S. REP. No. 281, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992).
158 id.
159 Such a plan would require substantive notice requirements. Notice should include
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action taken to implement it were to be included in the committee report. 16
This was a good beginning, but the plan needed to be refined.
The statute says that balanced representation on a committee should be
determined in light of the "functions to be performed by the advisory
committee." 161 This becomes problematic when there is a committee whose
function is limited to a scientific technical purpose, yet whose impact
socially and economically is potentially much broader.162 Therefore,
"relevant interests" needs to be defined in terms of not only the function of
the committee, but also in terms of the foreseeable significant social and
economic impacts. Special efforts must be made to contact those whose
interests will be significantly impacted. 163 Where an unreasonable attempt is
made by the official to achieve balance, then relief for the parties excluded
should more easily, although not automatically, be granted.
The second part of prong one, whether the excluded party is at fault,
provides assurance that parties are seeking relief in good faith. In the event
that a reasonable plan is followed by the federal official, the party seeking
relief must demonstrate that they were not "sleeping on their rights" or
attempting to undermine the committee process through delayed
intervention. Parties who did not actually receive notice or who are
otherwise reasonably excused may be granted relief. But parties who are
unable to meet their burden of good faith should be denied relief.
The second prong of the test, whether the negotiations are ongoing,
reflects a potential conflict in the circuits over when injunctive relief is
enough information to allow parties to know if their interests are to be affected.
160 S. REp. No. 281, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992).
161 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2) (1995).
162 See Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 Alabama-Tombigbee
Rivers Coalition v. United States Dep't of Interior, No. Civ.A.93-AR-2322-5, 1993 WL
646410 (N.D. Ata.), aff'd, 26 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1994).
163 This requirement should be modeled after the requirements of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (1994). This Act requires the publication of an analysis
that describes the effects a proposed rule has on small businesses. This analysis is subject to
public comment. The agency must provide reasonable notice to small businesses to encourage
their participation.
Similarly here, relevant interests could be described in a published analysis of a
proposed committee's function. Public comment could be provided to help bolster the
agency's analysis for those interests which could be affected. Then actual notice could be
provided to those relevant interests.
One concern is that so many parties would respond to certain committee announcements
that the number of relevant interests would exceed the practical limitations of negotiation. In
this case there could either be a pooling process or negotiations may have to be reconsidered
as the appropriate method for resolving the issue.
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appropriate. There is some agreement among courts that injunctive relief
should be granted to an excluded party on an alleged violation of balance
while the negotiation is continuing. 164 The proposed test affirms this point
ofview, assuming that the party has met the good faith burden. But there is
potential disagreement, depending on how one interprets the case law, as to
whether relief should be granted after the committee makes its
recommendation. 165 There are at least three possible forms of injunctive
relief that could be granted at this stage. First, the court might require a
reconvening of the committee to allow the aggrieved party to be heard.
Second, the court might enjoin the agency from acting on the proposed
recommendation. Third, the court might invalidate the agency's action
altogether. Only the second type of relief has ever actually been granted. 166
The first may appear too burdensome, 167 but any costs should be weighed in
terms of the potential benefits of avoiding future litigation of challenge to
the rule (and this balance could come out either way). The third type of
action is most controversial and would likely be justified in only the most
164 Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition 26 F.3d at 1107 ("We find injunctive relief as
the only vehicle that carries the sufficient remedial effect to ensure future compliance with
FACA's clear requirements."); Seaule Audubon 871 F. Supp. at 1309 ("FACA can and
should be enforced by injunctive relief during the process; that is, by an order requiring that a
proposed or existing committee comply with the statute.").
165 In Seaule Audubon, the court, in its consideration of injunctive relief for a FACA
violation, drew a distinction between granting such relief while the negotiation process is still
occurring and granting such relief either after the recommendation has been made or the
committee has served its purpose. Id. The court noted that agency action based on the
recommendation of a committee had not been invalidated, and proceeded to distinguish
Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition. It did so by noting that "the plaintiffs obtained a
temporary restraining order before the report was distributed and used by the government."
Id. at 1310. As the Seaule Audubon court read it, the injunction was granted during the
negotiation process, as opposed to after the committee had made its recommendation and
served its purpose. Therefore, the Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition holding only
authorized injunctive relief during the process of negotiation. It would not require automatic
invalidation of every agency action based on recommendations made by advisory committees
formed illegally under FACA, because it was reconcilable with numerous opinions denying
injunctive relief. Id.
166Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition 26 F.3d at 1003 (enjoining the Fish and
Wildlife Service from listing the Alabama Sturgeon on the endangered species list based on
the recommendation of an illegal advisory committee).
167 National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Califano, 603 F.2d 327, 336 (2d Cir. 1979)
(finding the fact that the agency was not going to reconvene the committee a sufficient reason
not to grant injunctive relief).
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extreme cases, if ever. 168 This inquiry into the ongoing nature of the
negotiations relates to the third and final prong.
The final prong of the proposed test requires an inquiry into the nature
of the post-negotiation relief. An opportunity for contemporaneous
participation by parties with a direct interest in negotiation best serves the
purpose of FACA. 169 This aspect of the test is an attempt to address a
perceived shortcoming in case law which suggests that appropriate relief for
parties unfairly excladed is the traditional public comment process. 170 The
problem with this suggestion, in terms of negotiation theory, is that it fails
to consider the benefits derived by the committee from the excluded
viewpoint. The reason negotiated rulemaking has gained momentum is
precisely because of the inadequacies of the hybrid method. This is not to
say that the public comment process is always inadequate; but rather it
cannot be assumed in every case to be the best solution for a party who has
been wrongfully excluded.
Different factors should be considered, such as whether the negotiation
process is ongoing. The earlier in the negotiation that relief is sought, the
less adequate post-negotiation relief is for a deserving party. The nature of
the interest being represented is also important. If a large portion of affected
interests, for example a group of industries or large public citizen's group,
is asking to be heard, then post-negotiation is less adequate from the
168 Perritt claimed that "fr]eztedies for violation of FACA are limited and probably do
not include invalidation of agency decisions made in reliance on advisory committee
proceedings that violate FACA." Perritt, supra note 33, at 1704. See also National Nutritional
Foods Ass'n v. Califano, 603 F.2d at 336 ("So far as we are aware, no court has held that a
violation of FACA would invalidate a regulation adopted under otherwise appropriate
procedures, simply because it stemmed from the advisory committee's recommendations, or
even that pending rulemaking must be aborted and a fresh start made.").
169 One circuit court has reasoned that the purpose of FACA, to subject the use of
advisory committees by the government to public scrutiny, required an emphasis on openness
and debate. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition 26 F.3d at 1106. Therefore the timing of
the public's observation of an advisory committee is crucial. Id. Public comment must be
contemporaneous to the advisory committee process since retrospective commentary would
render FACA requirements meaningless. Id. (quoting the district court). The court concluded
that "[tlo allow government to use the product of a tainted procedure would circumvent the
very policy that serves as the foundation of the Act." Id. at 1107.
170 Seattle Audubon Society 871 F. Supp. at 1310 (quoting Secretary Babbitt). National
Nutritional Foods Ass'n 603 F.2d at 336 ("Applicable rulemaking procedures afford ample
opportunity to correct infirmities resulting from improper advisory committee action prior to
the proposal.") As another example of inadequate relief, one court denied injunctive relief
because the government claimed that had FACA been followed, the result would have been
the same. Northwest Forest Resource Council 846 F. Supp. at 1015.
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standpoint of finality of the negotiated result. This relates to the expanded
notion of "relevant interest" discussed above. The adequacy and availability
of the record of the committee is also important. 171
V. CONCLUSION
The use of advisory committees has historically proven to be a
controversial practice. As a measure aimed at providing for political
accountability, FACA lessened the controversy surrounding the practice,
but FACA did not erase the controversy. Political legitimacy and
successful, effective negotiation are two values that clash within the
framework of FACA. The suggested solution herein attempts to resolve this
clash and to erase more of the existing controversy over the advisory
committees. At the heart of this proposal is the notion that balanced
representation on the full committee can ensure the political legitimacy of
the negotiation process, even if some of that process is conducted in private.
This solution does not significantly thwart the concerns of negotiation
theorists on either side of the open-meetings issue, and it helps to achieve
171 The 1992 proposed Amendment suggested a process that made access to committee
documents easier. S. REP. No. 281, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1992). This idea is endorsed
here with certain expansions. The amendment proposed to make documents available from a
central location and within forty-eight hours of the meeting that would cover the subject of the
document. This notion could be expanded and incorporated into relief granted by the courts.
First, it should be broadened to cover committee documents from the public comment period.
It may be overly burdensome to require all committees to make their documents available
from a central location and on a 48-hour-notice basis. If not, this requirement would alleviate
much of the difficulty of challenging a negotiated rule from a post-negotiation excluded
position. If it is too burdensome to require all committees to comply with these requirements,
then at least those documents of committees from which a court has determined that a party
has been wrongfully excluded should be made so available. Super availability could be a form
of injunctive relief. A court could grant a party wrongfully excluded to assist such parties in
their attempts to influence the agency post-negotiation. This type of relief could greatly
alleviate the information problem that typically faces such parties. For case law supporting
this type of remedy see Braniff Master Executive Council of the Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v.
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 693 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that release of transcripts is
the remedy for violating the Sunshine Act). This may not sufficiently meet the excluded
parties' needs if there is no adequate transcript available, or if there is a transcript, but the
excluded party is left only with the possibility of challenging the rule after it has been adopted
by the agency.
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the benefits of effective negotiation of closed meetings. The proposal has a
sound legal basis and could either be employed by an agency or enforced
through statutory interpretation by the courts.
David Faure

